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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5172
Intergovernmental finance is a significant source of sub-
national finance in most countries. In both industrial 
and developing countries, formula based “manna from 
heaven” general purpose transfers dominate but co-exist 
with highly intrusive micro-managed “command and 
control” specific purpose transfers. Both these types of 
transfers undermine political and fiscal accountability. 
Reforms to bring in design elements that incorporate 
incentives for results-based accountability are resisted 
by both donors and recipients alike. This is because the 
donors perceive such reforms as attempts at chipping 
away at their powers and recipients fear such programs 
This paper—a product of the Governance Division, World Bank Institute—is part of a larger effort in the department to 
reform intergovernmental finance to create incentives for accountable governance. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at shah.anwar@gmail.com. 
will be intrusive. This paper presents conceptual and 
practical underpinnings of grant designs that could 
further simplicity, objectivity, and local autonomy 
objectives while furthering citizen-centric results-based 
accountability. The paper further highlights a few notable 
recent initiatives in both industrial and developing 
countries that embrace such directions for reform. The 
paper concludes that results-based intergovernmental 
finance offers significant potential to minimize tradeoffs 
between local autonomy and accountability while 














































































3.  Results-based intergovernmental finance as a tool to 
respect local autonomy while strengthening bottom-up 







































































































































































































































regional  public  administration.  Performance  indicators  used  emphasize  (a) 
implementation  of  national  legislation  for  public  administration  reforms  especially 
reforming systems of managerial selection and evaluation; (b) innovations in enhancing 
effectiveness  of  structural  funds  such  as  monitoring  and  evaluation  systems;  (c) 13 
 








Availability  of  a  council  approved  district  development  plan  and  functional  planning 







agricultural  extension; (c) timely accountability and expenditure  decisions in line  with 
actual allocation ; (d) capacity building effort; (e) staff functional capacity; (f) tendering 












in‐kind  redistribution  to  residents.  In  a  federal  system,  lower  level  provision  of  such 
services – while desirable for efficiency, preference matching, and accountability – create 
difficulty in fulfilling federal equity objectives. Factor mobility and tax competition create 
































These  are  equal  per  capita  payments  for  both  government  and  non‐government 
schooling to all states. Out of this the government schools component for each state is 
based  upon  each  state’s  share  of  full  time  equivalent  student  enrollments  in 
















  Raising  standards:  Agreeing  to  adopt  internationally  benchmarked  K‐12 
standards 
  Closing  the  data  gap:  Establish  data  bases  to  monitor  advances  in  student 
achievement and identification of effective instructional practices. 
  Improving quality of teachers and principals especially I high poverty schools: 




As  a  part  of  the  eligibility  for  financing,  each  state’s  record  will  be  examined  for  its 
compatibility  with  providing  a  progressive  environment  for  improving  education 
standards  and access.  For example, states that limit alternative routes to certification for 
teachers and principals or cap the number of charter schools will be at a competitive 
disadvantage.  States  that  explicitly  prohibit  linking  data  on  achievement  or  student 
growth  to  principal  and  teacher  evaluations  will  be  ineligible  for  the  grant  until  they 
change their laws (see Duncan, 2009). 
United States No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001  
The  NCLB  provides  federal  financing  of  elementary  and  secondary  education  (K‐12 
schooling) provided states agree to requirements for student testing, accountability and 








NCLB  requires  that  states,  school  districts,  and  schools  ensure  all  students  are 















“bad  school  finance  states”  –  those  which  spend  relatively  less  on  education  and 
distribute funds inequitably to school districts (see Foundation for New America, 2009). 
Local  governments  in  the  Province  of  Alberta,  Canada,  use  a  novel  approach  to 
determine the allocation of taxpayers’ contribution to school finance. This is done by 
resident taxpayers through designation of their education component of the property tax 
bill  to  either  public  or  parochial  (religious,  private)  school  boards.  These  declarations 








criteria  include:  number  of  credits  accumulated  by  students;  number  of  graduates; 
research  publications;  and  number  of  doctoral  dissertations  (see  Jongbloed  and 
Vossensteyn, 2001).  The following paragraphs cite specific examples of such finance.   















Finland  finances  higher  education  using  three  components  –  core  funding, 
performance funding and funding for specific initiatives. Performance funding is based 
upon:  funding  for  research  from  external  sources;  assessed  learning  achievement, 19 
 
provision  of  adult  education;  graduation  time;  and  participation  in  international 




Each  university’s  grant  is  based  upon  the  number  of  students  who  completed  their 
programs  multiplied  by  the  normative  study  duration  (4.5  years)  plus  the  number  of 
students  who  drop  out  multiplied  by  an  administratively  set  study  duration  of  these 















Conditional  non‐matching  output‐based  transfers  to  ensure  national  minimum 
standard  in  merit  goods  or  for  fiscal  need  compensation  are  rarely  used  in  DTEs. 20 
 
Nevertheless,  one  finds  a  few  shining  examples  of  programs  that  marry  equity  with 
performance orientation in grant allocation.   
Brazil  has  a  noteworthy  national  minimum  standards  grant  programs  for  primary 
education.  Under  the  14
th  amendment  to  the  federal  constitution,  the  state  and 
municipal government must contribute 15% each of their two principal revenue sources 
(state value added tax and state share of the federal revenue sharing transfers for states, 





































 (2)  Portability:  Residents  have  the  ability  to  move  to  another  province  and  retain 
health  coverage  in  the  province  of  origin  for  a  transition  period.  Residents  and  non‐
residents have equal access. 
(3)  Public  insurance  but  public/private  provision:  The  province  agrees  to  provide 
universal insurance to all but financing of public and private providers on equal footing – 








































5.  Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, while output‐based (performance) oriented grants are best suited to the 
grantor’s  objectives  and  also  simpler  to  administer  than  traditional  input‐based 





























































































































































































































































Source: Anwar Shah, “A Practioner’s Guide to Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers,” in Robin 
Boadway and Anwar Shah (eds.), Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers (Washington, D.C.: World 
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